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ABSTRACT 
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~an be adminiSl<:red in qU<lntilied amount, whidl can be used to change what woulJ normally be a 
good taLti,-al J~ision into a bad one. This th"si~ u,e, a ,oftware ra~kdge Lalled Tactical Tic-Tae-To" 
(T4), tn simubt" Lommand and ~ontrol d,'d,ions being made in an informa'.ion warfar .. "nvironment. 
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Military ... 'arfare has always been a dynamic process which 
has reflected the technical advances of the societies 
practicing it. History teaches us that warfare strategies and 
tactics have evolved in their complexity from their earliest 
roots. Ancient warfare strategies consisted of spotting the 
enemy first, and attacking with rocks, sticks, and anything 
else which could be picked up and used as a weapon. Spotting 
one's adversary, evaluating the threat posed by that 
adversary, determining whether to attack, and planning the 
attack were phases of what was probably the earliest command 
and control (C2) process. 
Today's warfare relies on a much more sophisticated 
process to achieve much the same result. Now we spot the 
enemy with satellites and other sophisticated surveillance 
equipment. We evaluate the threat using supercomputer models 
to aid in our analysis, and we plan the attack using joint 
forces. Finally we might execute the attack using laser-
guided munitions launched from standoff attack aircraft, 
dropping bombs through elevator chutes in the tops of enemy 
buildings. The result is the same as with the ancient 
approach, because ultimately the threat from the enemy is 
eliminated. 
In essence, warfare is a simple idea. Enemies perceive a 
threat from one another, and then wreak havoc on each other to 
eliminate that threat. Some of the difficulty in practicing 
the art of warfare is rooted in the complex ways in which we 
as human beings interact with each other, how we communicate 
with one another, and how we choose to resolve our conflicts. 
certainly entire libraries could be filled with works which 
str i ve to explain some of these complex issues. There is 
however, a common thread which appears in warfare, be it 
simple survival or more:. devastating theater nuclear warfare. 
That common denominator is that all throughout the process. 
people make decisions. They make good decisions, bad 
decisions, quick decisions, possibly ill-informed 
decisions. None the less, the process of warfare is filled 
with decision-making. 
OVERVIEW 
This thesis is an attempt to examine the effects of 
information warfare (IW), especially those which result when 
the warfare is directed toward command and control (C2) 
decision-makers. IW is both an old and a new idea. That is, 
the concept dates to toe earliest writings on warfare (Wu, 
1944) . As will be discussed later, recent changes in 
information technology have brought sinilarly advanced changes 
in the concept of IW. 
This thesis investigates how human decision-making in the 
stressful environments found in military conflict can be 
altered. The goal of practitioners of IW is always concerned 
with affecting the decisions made by the enemy. with 
understanding of the effort required to force changes in 
decision making, it is easier to target the processes which 
are involved in making those decisions. 
PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether IW, when 
directed at a C2 decision-maker, can be administered in 
quantified anounts that can be used to change what would 
normally be a good tactical decision into a bad one. 
The next war will be fought in a new and unique 
battlefield area called cyberspace. The cyberspace is lined 
with information highways, and like any major highways, these 
information highways will carry vital supplies to and from the 
front. The new-age weapons which will decide the outcome on 
this new battleground will be unlike any the world has 
previously witnessed. C2 warfare will permeate the battle 
field. The Armed Forces Staff College Student Text on Joint 
C2 Warfare, defines C2 warfare as the integrated use of 
operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological 
operations (PSYOP), eTectronic warfare (EW), and physical 
destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny 
information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary 
command and control (C2) capabilities and to protect friendly 
Command and Control against such actions (Joint, ~993). 
Information is the new prize in warfare, and to be able to 
control it, we must first understand how it is transmitted, 
received, comprehended, processed, stored, and displayed. 
This thesis is a small step in accomplishing these things. It 
is a first step in the long process of constructing the 
foundation with which we must build our knowledge base. By 
using the results of this study, we can continue our march 
toward understanding. 
There are studies which foCUS on understanding the 
decision-making process in humans. Likewise, there 
studies which focus primarily on explaining offensive and 
defensive IW tactics. The purpose of this thesis is to serve 
as a bridge between th5"'se two areas of research. It is an 
effort to understand first whether decision making in a 
dynamic warfare environment is vulnerable to IW tactics. 
Working from a common understanding of IW, and how it is 
basically carried out, the thesis then examines decision-
making in a military situation under the added stress imposed 
by IW. It is an examination with an attempt at quantifying 
the level of IW needed to affect the quality of decisions made 
in such an environment. 
II. DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
The term "information warfare" is in vogue in the military 
community as of late, but the idea of IW predates all of 
modern warfare history. It is a precept that has been used by 
clever military leaders to defeat their enemies since the 
beginn.lng of organized warfare. Why then has the .ldea of IW 
taken on special signiticance once again? To understand the 
answer, we must reflect on the nature of change that has 
occurred in warfare over the years. To non-students of 
military history, these changes, when considered individually, 
may seem subtle and irrelevant. To those who make it their 
business to understand warfare though, these changes are 
dramatic to say the least. Alan Campen, in his book on 
information war, talks about the incredible importance of IW, 
as it was used in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 
The united States unveiled a radically new form of warfare 
in the Persian Gulf in 1991. By exploiting knowledge, it 
devastated Iraq's formidable milj.tary machine, astonished 
the world, confounded defense critics, surprised itself 
and quite possibly changed the standards for performance 
of u.S. forces in armed conflict. By leveraging 
information, u.S. and allied forces brought to warfare a 
degree of flexibility, synchronization, speed and 
precision heretofore unknown (Campen, 1992). 
So what is IW, and how can it be so important? Perhaps 
the best way to render a definition is to look at each word by 
itself. Most of us have a general idea of what information 
is. For our purposes, let's deflne information as knowledge 
of a specific event or situation. For information to be 
knowledge, it must have meaning to us. Therefore, if lt is to 
have meaning to us, we must clearly differentiate information 
from the term, data. Data is perhaps better thought of as raw 
information; that is, it is information in a form which 
doesn't necessarily convey meaning to the user. For example, 
in a computer file, l's and O's represent data. However, the 
l' sand 0' s eventually are turned into words which combine to 
give us information. 
The next word to define is warfare. If one were to look 
up warfare in the dictionary, there would likely be a 
definition which included phrases such as, "armed conflict" 
and "battles." But as we wi 11 learn, warfare has evolved to 
the point where these definitions are outdated. Warfare need 
not, and often does not necessarily entail the use of arms. 
At least not arms in the sense we are familiar with such as 
rifles and bullets. Harfare can be conducted without ever 
firing a shot. And that, to a large degree, is What IW is all 
about. So for the purposes Of this paper, the author will 
define warfare as a m.anifestation of hostilities, usually 
b8tween nations, with the intent of effecting control over the 
opponent nation's actions or policies. Therefore, information 
warfare can be broadly defined as: 
attenpts by one opponent to gain control over an 
adversary's actions or policies through manipulation of 
the adversary's information processes. 
Infornation processes include all facets of information 
collecting, storlng, processing, transporting, and displaying. 
Manipulation might include slmpJy lntercepting and examining 
the content of the information. Or it might include something 
more drastic such as destroying, altering the contents or 
display of, or de1aying the transport of information. with 
this starting basis, we can now understand why the concept of 
IW is hardly something new. In fact, nilitary historians 
almost always include the works of Sun Tzu as they try to 
understand mllitary confllct. Author George Orr, in his book 
on Comba.t operations ell: Fundamentals and Interactions, 
wr i tcs about the "modern" flavor of many of Sun Tzu's 
observations. Sun Tzu's The Art of h'ar was written someWhere 
around 350 Be, yet it clearly details the importance of 
information ;,,'arfare (albeit not by its recently coined name) 
to leaders in their quest to Wln wars. Sun TzU taught that 
skillful strategists should be able to subdue the enemy's army 
without engaging it, conquer its cities without destroying 
them, and overthrow the enemy state without bloodshed (Orr, 
1983). 
III. TACTICAL TIC-TAC-TOE (T4) 
The best approach in examining human decision-making would 
be to carry out an experiment in the actual environment in 
which decision-makers operate. Though preferred, obviously 
this approach lS the most difficult one to take in any 
experiment. It is difficult to marshall the resources in 
time, money, and personnel to carry out "live fire" testing. 
The next preferred scientific approach would be to carry out 
an experiment using live subJects in a controlled environDent 
such as a laboratory. This approach also consumes a lot of 
resources, but is generally cheaper and more workable than 
live testing. The siDplest approach however, is to carry out 
simulation using automated tools to simUlate the 
environnent, subjects, and decision processes, This is the 
approach which will be used in this thesis. 
The simUlation in this thesis will use a software package 
called Tactical Tic-Tac-Toe (T4). T4 was developed at the 
Naval Post Graduate School for use in the Command Control and 
communications (C3) curriculum. The sinulation is carried out 
using personal computers. 'l'he program essentially is a 
modified version of the well known Tic-Tac-Toe game which is 
played by kids everywhere. In T4, two adversaries (or teams 
of adversaries) are pitted against each other in an effort to 
win Tic-Tac-Toe (TTT) matches. Simulated X- and O-players 
calculate their best move accordlng to a preprogrammed 
strategy, and simultaneously attempt to take a square. Unlike 
conventional Tic-Tac-Toe, T4 uses a double-wide grid (6x3 
lnstead of 3x3), which presents tWlce as many squares to fill 
with X's and O's. In conventional Tic-Tac-Toe, there are 
eight possible ways in which to construct a scoring 
combination, but in '14 there are 26 ways to score. For each 
side of the 'T4 board, there are the eight combinations of ways 
to score found in conventional Tic-Tac-Toe (for a total of 16 
scoring conbinations). But there are also 10 "Crossover" 
scoring combinations as·well (Tic-Tac-Toe's which start on one 
side of the board and cross into the next side). The board 
layout and all scoring possibilities are displayed graphically 
in Appendix A. 
In T4, we can model the characteristics of team members, 
as well as the conditions under which the contest will take 
place. The next two sections summarize T4 characteristics and 
conditions. This is followed by a section of T4 definitions. 
A. T4 CHARACTERISTICS & CONDITIONS 
• Replications - this 1S the number of games played per 
contest 
• Player Style - each player can be modeled as Total 
Offense, Balanced Offense, Balanced, Balanced Defense, 
Total Defense, and Random 
• Fog-of-~·;ar 
are chosen, 
- both a Regular and Crossover FO,,' value 
from 0 to 100% 
• Ini tlal and Subsequent Turn Conflict Resolution - this 
allo\;'s the user to determine how conflicts will be 
resolved when both players attempt to occupy the 
square on the same turn 
• Mission Assigned - players are assigned a 
several choices, including Victory Left, 
Victory Crossover, victory Overall, 
Survi va 1 Right, Survival crossover, and 
• Tactical Delay - a one through nine step delay can be 
assigned a player, in reference to his direct opponent on 
his side Of the board 
• Area Delay - a one through nine step 
to the opponent of a player's partner 
X-player and the left side a-player) 
can be assigned 
the right side 
• communications Delay - a one through nine step delay can 
be assigned between partners on the same sIde of the board 
(i.e. the left and right side X-players) 
B. T4 PLAYER STYLES 
The T4 player styles are explained as follows: 
• Total Offense - on a given turn, a player on either side 
of the board (left or right) attempts to score a TTT on 
his own side. This simulates a tactical engagement where 
a member is concerned only with winning his immediate 
battle 
• Balanced Offense - A team gives egual weight to offense 
(scoring a TTT) and defense (blocking a TTT). In the case 
of a tIe, an offensive move is chosen 
• Balanced - Team offense and defense with a random tie 
breaker 
• Balanced Defense - same as Balanced Offense except ties 
are broken by choosing a defensive move 
• Total Defense - blocking opponent's TTT's are top priority 
• Random - no strategy is used when choosing a move 
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C. T4 TERMS DEFINED 
FOW 1S a mlliary term which descrlbcs the general state of 
uncertainty which is inherent in nilitary conflict. One can 
think of FOW as the haze which clouds the true reality of a 
si tua tion. In many si tuatlons, mi Ii tary leaders must make 
plans and execute declsions v.'ithout knowing all of the 
pertinent facts. Through the FOW, the enemy rr.ight appear to 
be stronger than he is -in reality. The tactlcal picture may 
appear to a conmander as if an full-scale attack is eminent, 
even ".Then lt really is not. T4 models this characteristic and 
adds uncertainty to the outcones of player's moves. A 
player's best calculated nove may be to the center square, but 
when the FOW is factored in, his piece ends up in a corner 
square. This FOW feature is set before-hand in terms of the 
percentage of the true calculated value of a move which may be 
added or subtracted (i.e. a Move may be calculated to be worth 
3.2, but a FO\>,' value of 50% ,,'auld cause the move to be 
randomly valued between 3.2 plus or minus 50% of 3.2, or 
between 1.6 and 1..8). 
Players in T4 attempt to move sinultaneously. Obviously 
this means that opponents might attenpt to occupy the same 
space on a given turn. There exists a method to resolve 
conflicts of this nature. The first and subsequent "winners" 
might be randomly chosen, alternated, or chosen according to 
a weighting factor. 
A team is assigned a mission. A victory mission is won if 
a team wins more TT1"s than his opponent. A Survival mission 
is one in ',,'hich a team \\'ins if it at least ties its opponent 
in number of TTT's achleved. 
T4 delays reflect the real delays in intelligence faced by 
military units. A Tactical Delay of two time steps means that 
you are delayed in seeing what your opponent's move is for two 
complete turns. You continue to make moves, but you are 
essentially operating blindly because you are not aware ot 
where your opponent has recently moved. Not only does this 
mean you cannot effectlvely block your opponent's scoring 
attempts, but you might attempt to move into squares which you 
will only later learn that your opponent has occupied. This 
is crucial, because you don't get another chance to occupy a 
square on that turn, so you have lost your chance to Move. 
Area Delay operates on a similar principle. This delay is 
between a player and his partner's opponent. Obviously this 
delay becomes more important when "Crossover" missions are 
assigned. These require coordinated effort on the part of the 
left and right players. 
Comm Delay is between the left and right players of a 
team. With this delay, players are unable to see what their 
partner is doing for the length of the delay. Like Area 
Delay, this delay is more viti'll durring "Crossover" missions. 
The complete conflguration used for this simUlation is 
described in Appendix B. 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
For the thes1s to be of value in simulating reality, it is 
important to mouel the T4 sinulation correctly and to choose 
meaningful measures of etfectiveness (MOE's). The simulation 
lends ltself to some useful 1-lOE's. The number of TTT's scored 
by the "friendly" a-team obviously serves to give an effective 
measure of ho ..... ' we are doing in the simUlation. The simulation 
also offers us the opportunity to measure progress in terms of 
missions completed by either side. Finally, there is the 
capability to add a degree of fidelity to our MOE by using the 
total friendly TTT's minus the total enemy TTT's. This 
friendly-to-enemy TTT casualty ratio adds the real life 
concern of Commanders in considering the human cost of 
friendly losses in achieving enemy losses. 
As stated earlier, the goal of this thesis is to 
demonstrate whether IW, when directed at a C2 decision-maker, 
can be adninistered in quantified amounts which can be used to 
change what would normally be a good tactical decision into a 
bad one. It was pointed out earlier that IW results in 
destroying, altering the contents or display of, or delaying 
the transport of information. The closest things T4 offers in 
terms of II .. are the FOW and Delay features. Therefore, these 
features are varied to determine 1f and ho,,' they affect the 
MOE's. 
IV. EXPERIMENT PLAN - A C2 DECISION UNDER RISK 
The follm>ling is the detailed experiment plan used for 
this T4 simulation. For an introduction to T4 experiments, 
the reader is directed to read Eugene Zarrillo's thesis on a 
systems evaluation approach to T4 (Zarrillo, 1993). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose and Scope 
This experiment provides insight as to the impacts 
"fog of war" and various "delays" have on a commander's 
ability to win engagements, and successfully complete his 
assigned mission. Additionally, the experiment determines 
whether FOW and delays affect the friendly-to-enemy casualty 
ratio. FOW and delay are effects which result from the waging 
of IW against an opponent. 
Specifically, this experiment answers the following 
questions: 
• What impact does FOW have on the number of engagements 
won, mission accomplishment, and the friendly-to-enemy TTT 
casualty ratio? 
Does more timely tactical intelligence impact the number 
of engagements won, mission accomplishment, or the 
friendly-to-encmy T.TT casualty ratio? 
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• Does more timely area intelligence impact the 
engagements won, mission accomplishment, or the 
to-enemy TTT casualty ratio? 
• Does more timely communications intelligence impact the 
number of engagements won, mlssion accomplishment, or the 
friendly-to-enemy TTT casualty ratio? 
• Are there any interactions between the four factors (FOW, 
Tactical Delay, Are.a Delay, Conm Delay) which impact the 
number of engagements won, mission accomplishment, or the 
friendly-to-enemy TTT casualty ratio? 
a. Approach 
The experiment uses Tt. as a C3 sinulator to 
generate data to answer the above questions. 
b. Anticipated Results 
It is believed this experiment \-"ill indicate 
mission effectiveness (either in terms of numbers of friendly 
missions successfully completed, or a larger delta between the 
number of friendly versus enemy missions completed) diminishes 
with increaslng FOW. Additionally, it is also expected that 
the data will show th~t timely (delays of zero) Tactical, 
Area, and Comm intelligence leads to higher mission 




The T4 simulation a Macintosh 
microcomputer with output generated in a spreadsheet format 
(Microsoft Excel). 
b. Test Subjects 
Corr.puter sill'.ulated players for the T4 runs. 
special Equipment 
None. 
d. Schedule of Trials 
Conducted 5",,18 May 
2. Hypotheses 
Null hypotheses are given for each of the categories 
of effects. Although not specifically listed, alternative 
hypotheses exist for each null hypothesis. For each null 
hypothesis that is rejected, it should be understood that 
there is support for an alternative hypothesis. 
a. FOW Erfects 
Ho-l: FOW levels have no effect on the number of 
engagements (TTT's) won by the friendly side. 
Ha-2: FOW levels have no effect on the number of 
friendly missions completed. 
Hu-3: FOW levels have no effect on the friendly-
to-enemy TTT casualty ratio. 
b. Tactical Delay Effects 
Ho-4: More responsive inte lligence systems 
(Tactical Delay of zero) affect the number of engagements 
(TTT's) won by the friendly side. 
110-5: More responsive lntelligence systems 
(Tactical Delay of zero) have no effect on the number of 
friendly misslons completed. 
responsive intelligence systems 
(Tactical Delay of zero) affect the friendly-to-enemy TTT 
casualty ratio. 
c. Area Delay Effects 
Hu-7: More responsive intelligence systems (Area 
Delay of zero) affect the number of engagements (TTT's) won by 
the frlendly side. 
HJ -8: More responsive intelligence systems (Area 
Delay of zero) have no effect on the number of friendly 
missions completed. 
Hn-9: More responsive intelligence systems (Area 
Delay of zero) do not affect the friendly-to-enemy 
casualty ratio. 
d. communications Delay Effects 
He-lO: More responsive intelligence systems (Comm 
Delay of zero) do not affect the number of engagements (TTT's) 
won by the friendly side. 
Hn-ll: More responsive intelligence systems (Comm 
Delay of zero) have no effect on the number of friendly 
missions completed. 
H~-12: More responsive intelligence systems (Comm 
Delay of zero) do not affect the triendly-to-enemy TTT 
casualty ratio. 
3. Assumptions 
The key assumption in this experiment is that computer 
simulated players perform closely enough to actual human 
players such that the experimental results can be considered 
valid. Also, each factor's population mean is normally 
distributed with equal variance within each populat~on. 
Finally, each simulation run is considered independent. 
4. Statistical Design of Experiment 
The experiment is structured as a 5x41. full factorial 
exper iment wi th K equa.l to three. K represents the three 
factors Tactical Delay, Area Delay, and Comm Delay. The 
fourth factor in the 5x4" experiment represents 5 different 
FOW levels (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%). This leads to a 
total of 135 different combinations of FOW, Tac Delay, Area 
Delay, and Comm Delay. 
Fifty replications were run for each corr,bination. The 
total number of trials was 5x27x50=6,750. Table 1 illustrates 
the conbinations of the factors (F = FOw, T = Tac Delay, A = 
Area Delay, & C = Carom Delay) which were inclUded in the 
simulation. An entry of 3, 2, 1, 0 would indicate a FOW value 
of 3 (equal to 75%), ~ Tactical Delay value of 2 steps, an 
Area Delay of 1 step, and a Communications Delay of 0 steps. 
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TABLE 1 '1'4 COMBINATIONS 
s. Measures 
Three MOE's are used. These are: 
• Total number of friendly CO-player) TTT's 
• Total number of assigned friendly (O-player) missions 
successfully completed 
• Total number of friendly TTT's minus the total number of 
enemy TTT's (O-X TTT's) 
c. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Raw Data 
A sample of the raw data is contained in Appendix c. 
2. Data Problems 
No significant data problems were encountered. 
3. Data Cod inq Scheme 
Tactical, Area, Comm Delay: 
o - No Time Delay 
1 - One Turn Time Delay 
2 - Two Turn Time Delay 
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Fog of \~ar: 
o - 0% Level 
1 - 25% Level 
2 - 50% Level 
J - 75% Level 
4 - 100% Level 
.(. Data Table 
Given the following abbreviations, a sample data table 
follows: 
Fog of War = FOW Tae Delay = TD Comm Delay =- CD 
Area Delay = AD Mission Completed = HC Friendly TTT's = OTTT 
Friendly minus Enemy TTT's = OXT 
OTTT 
Data Reduction 
Eight columns of data out of the approximately 200 
total columns were manually extracted from the Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet containing the raw data. No other data reduction 
was accomplished. Raw data in the extracted eight columns 
was coded directly according to the data coding scheme 
detailed previously, then i:nported into Minitab for analysis. 
Note that the O-X columns in the data table were created from 
the individual 0 and X columns in the original spreadsheet. 
An example of the reduced data set is contained in Appendix D. 
O. ANALYSIS 
L Analysis Plan 
The reduced data, generated from 50 replications of 
each combination of the four factors (total of 6,750 trials), 
lI.'as analyzed using the Minitab statistics package. 
four-factor ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) was conducted for 
each of the three measures listed 'previously to determine if 
significant differences existed between popUlation means. 
First, the author used this statistical technique to 
identify significant differences bet""een the mean total number 
of friendly (a-player) TTT's under five different FaW levels, 
Tactical, Area, und Communicutions Delays of zero, one, and 
two units. The author then identitied interactions between 
various combinations of the four factors. 
Likewise, this statistical technique was used to 
identify significant differences between the mean number of 
missions successfully completed under five different FOW 
levels, Tactical, Area. and Communications Delays of zero, 
one, and two units. This application of ANOVA was aimed at 
explicitly answering the questions posed previously. 
Additionally, the author identified interactions between 
various combinations of the four factors. 
Finally, the author used this statistical technique to 
identify significant differences between the mean total TTT 
difference (friendly TT'r's - enemy TTT's) under five different 
FOW levels, Tactical, Area, and Communications Delays of zero, 
one, and two units. Finally, the author identified 
interactions between various combinations of the four 
factors. 
2. Methodology 
The author extracted the data of interest from the raw 
data, which were the four main factors (FOW, Tactical Delay, 
Area Delay, and Comm Delay), the O-player TTT's, the total 
score (representing missions completed), and the difference in 
total TTT's between the 0- and X-players. The author then 
encoded the data in accordance with the data coding scheme 
detailed previously. Following this, the encoded data was 
imported as a text file into Minitab for analysis (an example 
of ~linitab analysis results are contained in Appendix E). 
Next, the data was analyzed. Three four-factor ANOVA 
tests One Anova test was run with the a-player 
TTT's as the measure of interest. In the second test, the 
total l1ission Score was the measure of interest. Finally, in 
the third test the nurr.ber of a-x TTT's was the measure of 
interest. 
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Bas<o>d on a sign1ficance level of a= 0.05, the D.uthor 
evaluated the results at the four~factor J..NOVAs to identify 
signific<lnt effects of the factors and their 
interactions. Results with P-values less than or slightly 
above a were flagged for further investigation. One, tl-fO, and 
three-factor ANOVA tests ,,'ere performed on those factors and 
interactions identified as potentially significant in the 
previous step. A significance level of a= 0.05 was used. 
Dot plots of the four factors versus number of 0-
player TTT' s, total Mission Score, and a-x TTT' s, were 
constructed, and tables of neans by factor levels were 
constructed to show lnteraction between all two-factor 
combinations. Table data from Minitab were then used to 
construct graphical plots visually depictlng any and all 
interactions between each combination of two factors. 
In order to SUbstantiate the assumptlon that each 
factor's population '11ean was normally distributed, the author 
constructed normal probability plots. This was done for the 
a-player TTT's measure by sorting the a-player TTT's, running 
a Minitab NSCORES, and plotting the O-player TTT's versus the 
NscaRES output. The author repeated the process for the 
Mission Score, and the a-x 'I'TT measure (an example plot is 
contained 1n Appendix F). 
E. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
Analysis rosults were derived from Minitab statistical 
output products. 
1. Results for O-player TTT's as Measure of Interest 
The P-va]ues resultlng from the four-factor ANOVA 
test for a-player TTT's lndicated potential significant 
interactions bet'""een FOW*Tac Delay*Arca Delay, Tac Delay*Area 
Delay*Comm Delay, Tac Delay*Area Delay, Tac Delay*Comm Delay, 
Area Delay*Comm Delay, and FOW*Tac Delay (i. e., P-values less 
than or close to 0:). The three single delay factors Tac, 
Area, and Comm had P-values < a indicating possible 
significant impact on mission accomplishment. 
These factors and combinations were investlgated 
further using three, two, and one-factor ANOVA tests using a 
significance level of 0:"" 0.05. The three-factor ANOVA run on 
FOW*Tac Delay*Area Delay resulted in a P-value of 0.005 '",hich 
indicated a significant interaction between these three 
factors. The three-factor ANOVA run on Tac Delay*Area 
Delay*Comm Delay resulted in a P-value of 0.034 which 
lndicated a signlficant interaction between these three 
factors. The two-factor ANOVA run on Tac Delay*Area Delay 
indicated significant interaction between these two factors. 
The two-factor ANOVA rJln on Tac Delay*Comm Delay indicated 
significant interaction between this combination of two 
factors. The t",,'o-factor ANOVA run on Tac Delay*Comm Delay 
indicated signlficant lnteraction between this combination of 
tHO factors. Also, the two-factor !,NOVA run on Fo\~*Tac Delay 
indicated significant interaction between this combination of 
two factors. Finally, results of the amplifying tests 
confirmed the single delay factors Tae, Area, and Comm had 
significant inpact on mission accomplishment. 
The dot plots for Fo\~ versus O-player TTT's indicate 
no FOW value has more lmpact than the other on a-player TTT's. 
The dot plots for the three delays versus l{ission Score tend 
to indlcate an impact. Each successively higher delay on the 
X-player results in a higher delta between the 0 and X-player 
TTT's. 
The lnteraction plots for O-player TTT's versus the 
three delays and the a-x TTT's versus FOW show no clear 
contradlctions to the results of the ANOVA tests. The normal 
plot for O-player TTT's reflects a straight line which 
substantiates the assumption the sample data came from a 
normal distribution. 
2. Results for Mission score as Measure of Interest 
The P-values resul ting from the four-factor ANOVA test 
for Misslon Score indicated potentlal significant interactions 
between Tac Delay*Area Delay, (i.e., P-values less than or 
close to a). 'The three single factors Tac Delay, Area Delay, 
and Comm Delay had P-values < a indicating possible 
significant i:npact on mission accomplishment. 
These factors and combinations were investigated using 
two, and one-factor ANOVA tests using a significance level of 
U"" 0.05. The two-factor ANOVA test run on Tac Delay*Area 
Delay resulted in a P-valuc of 0.0 which indicated significant 
interaction between these two factors. These arr.plifying tests 
confirmed the single factors, Tac Delay, Area Delay, and Carom 
Delay had sign~ficant impact on mission accomplishment. 
Dot plots for FOW versus Mission Score indicate no FOW 
value has more impact than the other on mission completion (as 
measured by Score). Dot plots for the delays versus Mission 
Score indicate an impact. Each successively higher delay on 
the X-player results in higher scores for the a-player. 
None of the interaction plots for Mission Score show 
strong interactions. This doesn't necessarily contradict the 
ANOVA tests, because there is little fidelity in a measure 
which only has t."w values (0 or 1). Since the Mission Scores 
for the a-player are equal to 0 or 1 (obviously not a normal 
distribution), it is meaningless to plot the NSCORES versus 0 
Mission Scores line to show normality. 
Results for O-X TTT's as Measure of Interest 
The P-values resulting from the four-factor ANOVA 
test for a-x indicated potential significant interactions 
between FOW*Tac DelaY*Area Delay, Tac Delay*Area Delay*comrn 
Delay, TilC Delay*Area Delay, Tac Delay*Comm Delay, and Area 
Delay*Comm Delay (i.e., P-valucs less than or close to u). 
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The three single delay factors Tac, Area, and Comm had 
P-values < Cl indicating possible significant b,pact on mission 
accomplishment. 
These factors and combinations were investigated 
further using three, two, and one-factor ANOVA tests using a 
significance level of Cl'" 0.05. The three-factor ANOVA run on 
FOW*Tac Delay*Area Delay resulted in a P-value of 0.043 which 
indicated a significant interaction between these three 
factors. The three-factor ANOVA run on Tac Delay*Area 
Delay*Comm Delay resulted in a p-value of 0.087 which 
indicated a possible significant interaction between these 
three factors. The two-factor ANOVA run on Tac Delay*Area 
Delay indicated significant interaction. The two-factor ANOVA 
run on Tac Delay*Comm Delay indicated significant interaction 
between this combination of two factors. Also, the two-factor 
ANOVA run on Area Delay*Comm Delay indicated significant 
interaction between these two factors. Finally, tests 
conf irmed the singl e delay factors Tac, Area, and Comm had 
significant impact on ~lssion accomplishment. 
The dot plots for FOW versus o-x TTT's indicate no FOW 
value has more impact than the other on a-x TTT's. Plots for 
the three delays versus Mission Score tend to indicate an 
impact. Each successively higher delay on the X-player 
results in a higher delta between the 0- and X-player TTT's. 
The interaction plots for O-X TTT's versus the three 
delays and the a-x TTT's versus FOW show no clear 
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contradictions to the results of the ANOVA tests, The nornal 
plot for o-x TTT's reflects a straight line, which 
substantiates the assumption the sanple data came from a 
norl'Jal distribution. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Hypotheses Results (Interpretations) 
The fallowing table summarlzes the results of the T4 
experiment. The first column groups the results by effect. 
The second column lists the relevant hypothesis. The third 
column shows whether the null hypothesis \o,'as accepted or 
rejected, and the last column gives the conclusions resulting 
from each outcome. 
2. Additional Interpretations 
The data from the ANOVA tests indicates that while 
each of the three delays (Tac, Area, and Carom) are 
statistically significant in and among theI:lselves, they are 
particularly significant when combined together in any fashion 
for each of the MOE's except Mission Score. When Mission 
Score is the operative MOE, only the combination of Tac and 
Area Delay conbine in a significant fashion. 
Also, while the data from the ANOVA tests indicates 
that each of the thr~e delays (Tac, Area, and Corom) are 
statistically significant, Tactical Delay (delay between 
opponents on the same side of the board) is clearly the most 
significant delay. 
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TABLE II SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
EFFECT HYPOTH DEC RESULT 
FOW H,1 Levels don't affect the friendly 
TTT's 
H02 Ace Levels don't affect the friendly 
nissions completed 
H,3 Levels don't affect the friendly-
to-eneny TTT casualty ratio 
Tae H,4 l-lore responsive lntelligence 
Delay affects the friendly TTT's 
H,5 Rej Evidence supports that more 
responsive intelligence affects 
the friendly missions completed 
H,6 More responsive intelligence 
affects the friendly-to-enemy TTT 
ratio 
Area Hl,7 More responsive intelligence 
Delay affects the number of friendly 
TTT's 
H,8 Rej Evidence supports more responsive 
intelligence affects the friendly 
misslons completed 
H,,9 Rej Evidence supports more responsive 
intelligence affects the 
friendly-to-enemy TTT ratio 
Comm HulO Rej Evidence supports narc responsive 
Delay intelligence affects the number 
of friendly TTT's 
Hlill Rej Evidence supports more responsive 
intelligence affects the number 
of friendly m>ssions completed I 
HQ12 Rej Evidenc::e supports more responsive 
intelllgence affects the 
friendly-to-enemy TTT ratio 
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The interaction plots are of particular interest in 
this experiment (Figures 4 through 21, Appendix F). The plots 
are used to visually deplct lnteractions between the various 
combinations of factors. Interactions are indicated when 
significant slope differences exist between lines representing 
similar combinations of factors. statistically, there are no 
additional significant interactions demonstrated by the plots 
beyond those resulting from the ANOVA tests. However, there 
are still observed phenomena which deserve mention. For 
example, Figure 6 shows the combined effects of FOW and Area 
Delay on the mean number of a 'l'TT's. One would expect that as 
Fo\~ and Area Delay levels are increased, the 0 T'l'T' s would 
respond uniformly in a linear fashion. However, what occurs 
is different than eXpected. At the highest level of Area 
Delay, the highest T'l"l' score occurs for the largest FOW value. 
The same type of phenomena is demonstrated in most of 
the other interaction plots. This effect, while not 
statlstically relevant .(as indicated by the ANOVA P-values), 
is indicative of interactions Which need to be explained. The 
interactions might be random (most likely for the FOW 
examples), or they might be the result of some different 
underlying cause. Regardless, further studies of these 
interactions are necessary to pinpoint their causes. 
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3. Real World Meaning of Results 
Clearly thlS data shows that delaying one's immediate 
opponent from grasping the tactical picture serves to greatly 
enhance the chances of lncreasing one's effectlveness for the 
three given MOE's of winning battles, winning missions 
(aggregate battles), and increasing one's · .. ,'On-to-loss ratio. 
Further, by delaying the enemy's understanding of "pieces" of 
the strategic picture (which might not be vie .... ·ed as 
immediately tactically important), that 
effectiveness increases. Finally, if one can combine delaying 
information to the immediate tactical opponent, as well as to 
other components of the enemy slde, the best advantage can be 
gained. 
V. DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
'l'he effects of delaying information to the adversary are 
clearly shm,,m by the siITulation. In reality, all !W tactics 
are geared to delaying .information to the enemy. T4 clearly 
demonstrates that II" can be effectively adninistered in 
quantified arr.ounts WhlCh, when targeted at the C2 decision-
maker, are sufficient to change what would normally be a good 
tactical decision into a bad one. 
Surprisingly, FOW dld not prove to be significant in the 
'l'4 experiment. In reality, FOW is a nebulous concept which to 
ddte, cannot be harnessed by one side over the other. In the 
experiment, FOW is nodelled as a feature ",'hich arbitrarily 
adds or subtracts value to an assigned move. In the long run, 
the effects of such a process would tend to cancel out. Half 
of all naves would tend to appear better than calculations 
truly indicate, while half of all moves would appear worse. 
The net effect is not unlike I-.'hat must occur in reality. FOW 
affects both sides in conflict, often causing commanders to 
error on the side of caution, and equally as often causing 
them to error on the side of risk. 
The simUlation does not indicate ·",hich IW tactics are most 
effective in targeting the C2 decision-maker. Like\>'ise, the 
simUlation does not indicate the specific level of effort 
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necossary to effect :o;uch changes, hOy,lever it does indicate 
that such anS';lcrt> do in fact exist. The next logical step in 
this process 1S to take the sinulati::m a step further, by 
conducting llve te:o;ting in a laboratory setting. 
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VI. SUG'!.ESTED FOLLOW-UP STUDIES 
The next step in this process would be to design and 
conduct a full experiment In which testing of live subjects is 
carr led out. For example, thlS type of experiment might be 
conducted in the DeciSlon Evaluation Facility for Tactical 
Teams (DEFFT) located at NPS. This facility simulates the ele 
area on U. S. naval ships. The facility contains a network of 
server-controlled workstations which locate, and monitor 
"tracks" of shlpping and air traffic. The lab offers 
controllers the ability to monitor test subjects as they 
attempt to navigate a ca.rrier battl.e group through a multitude 
of geographic settings. Subjects must evaluate the threats 
from their environment, and determine whether the tracks are 
"friendlies" or "bogeys." The test subjects operate according 
to assigned rules of engagement (ROE's). Such a setting would 
be ideal for testing the effects of IW against a C2 decision-
maker. The controllers can simUlate IW attacks against the 
fleet, and the responses from test subjects could be evaluated 
to determine the quantity and type of IW attacks necessary to 
force a "bad" decislon. 
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VII. CONCLOSION 
This thesis serves as a small step in understanding the 
effects of IW on the C2 decision-maker. It is not intended to 
provide a final answer to any specific question, but rather it 
is designed to aid in the research into the complex area of 
IW. The results of the T4 experiment indicate that there is 
reason to dig further. into the. effects of IW on the C2 
decision-maker. 
This simulation shows that information, when delayed to an 
opponent, can affect the outcome of a conflict. This might 
seem intuitive, but until the Desert Shield/Storm (DS/DS) 
conflict, high-tech IW was relatively unknown. It will be 
some time before the full details of the cyberspace warfare 
used in DS/DS are released for public consumption, but 
unquestionably this section of the battleground proved 
pivotal. What is clear is that the future battles waged over 
information may well decide the war before shots 
fired. As far-fetched. as this m.ight seem, it is a notion 
which the U.S. military is taking very seriously. 
It should not be forgotten that the U.S., arguably the 
world's leading user of information technology, also stands to 
be most affected by the successful refinement of IW tactics. 
The threats arrayed against our nation are currently 
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constituted by many emerqing third world countries, and 
radical extremist fundamentalist groups. These groups often 
operate in a non-traditional military fashion, employing 
tactics such as surprise and quickness. These tactics are 
exactly those which serve as the most devastating to a complex 
technological society such as the united states. The correct 
IW tactics employed in the right amounts, coupled with 
surprise and quickness, could be lethal to much of the 
information machinery which runs our society. It is therefore 
all the more important that we attempt to study and understand 
this "new" form of warfare. 
3. 
APPENDIX A: T4 BOARD LAYOUT .& SCORING POSSIBILITIES 
Figure 1 T4 Basic Board 
Figure 2 T4 Regular Scores 
I~ 
Figure 3 T4 Crossover Scores 
APPENDIX B: T4 SIMULATION PLAYER CONFIGURATIONS 
The T4 simulation runs were structured so that the a-player 
was the controlled player (i.e. the "friendly"). The 0-
settings were held constant throug~out the runs, and were set 
as follows: 
Balanced 
FOW "" 0% 
Conflict Resolution - Random at 50% 
• Mission - Victory Overall 
• Tactical, Area, & Corom Delay"" 0 
Some of the X-player (i.e. "the enemy") settings were varied, 
while some were held constant throughout all of the runs. The 
X-player settings were as follows: 
• Balanced 
• FOW - varied from 0 to 100% in steps of 25% 
• Conflict resolution - Random at 50% 
• Tactical, Area, & Comm Delay varied from 0 to 2 steps with 
all combinations included 
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APPENDIX C: T4 RAW DATA 
OL OR XL XR 
Msns Player Delay 
Date M1 TAC TAC 'rAe TAC Total 




5/14/94 VO SO 
5/14/94 
5/14/94 VO SO 22 
5/14/94 






5/14/94 22 22 

















APPENDIX E: MINITAB ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Factor Type Levels Values 
FOW fixed 
Tac DIy fixed 
Area DIy fixed 








Tac DIy*Area DIy 
Tac DIy*Comm DIy 






































Figure 4 Normal Plot a TTT'S 
OC~'. 
Figure 5 Normal Plot a-x TTT' S 
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
Area Delay vs FOW 
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Figure 10 Area Delay vs Comm Delay 
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Figure 11 Area Delay vs Comm Delay 
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Figure J.4 Tao Delay vs Comm Delay 
Figure J.5 Tao Delay VB Comm Delay 
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Figure 1.6 Comm Delay vs FOW 
Fiqure 1.7 Tac Delay va Area Delay 
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I'iqure 18 Tao Delay VII Co_ Delay 
I'iqure 19 Tae Delay VB Ar_ Delay 
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Fiqure 20 Tao Delay va FOW 
Fiqure 21 Tac Delay va FOW 
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NTB > DotPlot 'TTT 0'; 
SUBC> By 'FOW'. Each dot represents 9 points 
FOW 
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MTB > DotPlot 'Msn Be 0'; 
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